Introduction
Suppose love creates the closest relationship possible between two people and ideally drives the decision to marry. Further assuming that each person is intrinsically tied to his or her family and marked by his or her ethnic origin, marriage between people with different ethnic backgrounds expresses the closest feasible connection to the culture of the spouse. Marriages and marriage-like partnerships between immigrants and natives, termed 'intermarriage', are thus commonly considered to be an indicator of a high level of social integration, an index of assimilation, an indicator of social distance and cultural proximity, as well as an intimate link between social groups (Prince and Zubrzycki (1962), Gurak and Fitzpatrick (1982) , Klein (2001) , Kalmijn (1998) , and Muttarak (2004) ). When studying the relation between intermarriage and labor market outcomes, two competing hypotheses are relevant: (a) the productivity hypothesis, and (b) the selection hypothesis. According to the productivity hypothesis, intermarriage fosters economic integration as native spouses boost linguistic adjustment, provide knowledge of the local labor market, access to social networks, and insight into important structures. In addition, they explain local customs, norms, and peculiarities. Daily practice with the spouse enables intermarried immigrants to better communicate with native colleagues and to become better integrated into the working environment. Furthermore, intermarriage signals greater adaptability to the host country's society and a high level of familiarity with its foreign culture.
However, if intermarriage basically reflects commitment and the decision to stay immigrants who intermarry may experience economic success resulting only from their greater attachment. Those who intermarry may be more eager to acquire precious skills that are highly valued in the labor market, and meeting a native partner is merely a side product of this process. In addition, economic outcomes could be affected by other unobservable productivity characteristics correlating with intermarriage. Thus, according to the selection hypothesis, the relationship between intermarriage and economic success is spurious, and effects from intermarriage are biased if the self-selection into intermarriage based on individual factors is ignored. Consequently, intermarriage needs to be viewed as treatment that is possibly endogenously related to economic outcomes.
The empirical analysis benefits from using German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data. Panel data is more appropriate than cross-section data for this type of study because it allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Its longitudinal design provides a different estimation method from previous studies, which are predominately based on cross-sectional observations and rely on instrumental variables to control for self-selection. Instead, in this paper, a fixed effects regression framework is used to resolve the omitted variable problem. In addition, the empirical specification allows for the different timing of possible effects of intermarriage and accounts for general marital pay differentials. The empiri-3 cal analysis considers both men and women, while briefly examining the possible effects of intermarriage for natives.
Empirical findings indicate that male immigrants' immediate benefits from intermarriage are mainly driven by unobserved time-constant factors and vanish once selection into marriage is taken into account. In this regard, effects do not differ statistically between intermarriage and marriage between two immigrants.
However, those who eventually live with natives receive greater returns to labor market experience indicating generally enhanced productivity. Thus, intermarriage seems to signal greater economic integration. Native men do not receive any extra benefit from either marriage type, while native women seem to gain an advantage from marrying an immigrant. Immigrant women, on the other hand, do not benefit from either type of marriage, although negative effects are mitigated when controlling for unobserved factors and other observable characteristics. However, results for women must be treated carefully as selection issues related to their labor market participation are mainly set aside.
Within the upcoming chapter a short overview of German-specific facts and theoretical concepts related to intermarriage are presented. This includes a literature review of studies that analyze the determinants of intermarriage and its impact on economic assimilation in other countries. The empirical model is introduced in Section 3. Due to Germany's immigration history, definition issues are discussed separately in Section 4. Descriptive statistics of the underlying sample are given in Section 5. In Section 6 estimation results and its interpretation are presented.
The paper finally concludes with a summary and an outlook for further research. 
Background
Only in the years after 2000 did Germany acknowledge its status as an immigration nation. At the same time there is greater government attention to integrating immigrants. German-language requirements, accepting Germany's democratic norms, and accepting the rule of law are mandatory for those wanting to naturalize. But beyond language fluency and other indicators such as educational success and employment status, marriage to natives is generally considered a test of integration. According to that strand of literature, structural constraints in the marriage market such as gender ratios and partner availability (Angrist (2002) ), as well as interference by third parties, religious beliefs, socio-economic status, as well as cultural and linguistic proximity are the principle influences on the likelihood to intermarry. In addition, in certain cases intermarriage is related to the acquisition of citizenship and permanent residency, depending on legal status and country of origin. In this regard, intermarriage may be one possible way to legally immigrate to a foreign country. On the other hand, 'importing' spouses from their country of origin is sometimes the only legal route for admittance to the host country As stated by Becker (1974) , individuals generally prefer spouses with similar bundles of resources. Thereby the partner does not have to have the exact same level in each characteristic, but needs to compensate for shortages in one area by offering richness upon another. In particular, people usually prefer partners with similar education levels, which is called assortative mating by education (Chiswick and Houseworth (2008) ). Moreover, highly educated immigrants are expected to intermarry more often as discussed by Furtado (2006) and Furtado and Theodoropoulos (2010) . Accordingly, and apart from the fact that educational institutions provide platforms to meet potential partners, higher education accompanied by better communication skills enable immigrants to approach others, including natives, and help improve adaptation to different cultural habits (adaptability effect). Furthermore, highly educated immigrants are more likely to move away from ethnic enclaves and to live in neighborhoods with predominately native inhabitants. This, in turn, increases the likelihood of intermarriage (enclave effect). 2 Consequently, intermarried immigrants are likely to be a highly selective, 2 In addition, German law favors immigration of highly educated people who seek to immigrate 6 well educated subgroup of the total immigrant population. Contrarily, according to the selection hypothesis, the relationship between intermarriage and higher assimilation rates of immigrants is spurious due to sample selection. Immigrants who marry native spouses possibly belong to a highly selective sample of immigrants who possess highly valued labor market skills that are also highly valued in the native marriage market (Kantarevic (2004) They face a lack of understanding and feel detached from their ethnic group, and, as a consequence, rely neither on family ties nor social networks from their ethnic community to find a job. This, in turn, decreases the possibility of finding a job that matches immigrant's capabilities. 4 In addition, immigrants in intermarriage may face intolerance from the native partner's side. Relatives and friends may fail to tolerate and accept unfamiliar ways of living and unaccustomed perspectives.
Consequently, intermarried couples face many difficulties from both the ethnic group of the immigrant partner and the native society.
Finally, different perceptions and norms challenge the couple, thus inducing a high potential for conflicts within the marriage. 5 Kalmijn, Graaf and Janssen (2005) find a positive correlation between intermarriage and divorce, thus supporting the assumption that intermarriage faces greater stress than 'intra-immigrant marriages', that is marriage between two immigrants. Hence, even though intermarriage is associated with many benefits it can also be costly.
Analyzing the economic assimilation of intermarried immigrants in the United 
The Model
Most studies exploring the relation between intermarriage and earnings are based on instrumental variable approaches in cross sectional settings. The authors account for endogeneity of intermarriage by using specific ethnic group and gender ratios that measure the availability of partners within ethnic groups. The underlying assumption is that these ratios determine partner choice but are exogenous in the earnings equation.
In contrast, the model used here relies on a fixed effects (FE) approach to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The earnings equation is derived from a The earnings equation looks as follows 6 :
Thereby, the dependent variable, w it , denotes monthly labor gross earnings of immigrant i in period t, and is used as the productivity measure for individual i.
Nat it is an indicator variable which equals one if in period t person i is married to a native and zero else. The immediate effect of intermarriage for immigrants is then captured by β 0 . A supplementary regressor, Mig it , denotes marriage with another immigrant. Consequently, Mig it and Nat it capture effects from each type 6 As an extension, square terms Nat it (X it −X iNat ) 2 and Mig it (X it −X iMig ) 2 are included to account for decreasing returns to experience. of marriage in comparison to those who are unmarried at this point in time. 7 Apart from short term effects, marriage may affect labor market success gradually. For that reason, Korneman and Neumark (1991) include duration of marriage as an additional regressor. Here, a different measure is used: X it and X iNat (X iMig ) refer to labor market experience in period t and at the point of intermarriage (marriage with an immigrant). For immigrants the difference between X it and X iNat therefore captures experience gained during intermarriage. Equivalently, the difference between X it and X iMig captures experience gained in the course of marriage with an immigrant.
In case α 1 and β 1 are greater than zero, immigrants benefit from additional labor market experience acquired during the marriage compared to those who remain single. This might be due to favorable specialization within the marriage.
Negative coefficients could result from less flexibility and less mobility in comparison to singles, or stem from a lack of possibilities to search for jobs that optimally match one's abilities. Different signs of α 1 and β 1 could indicate different search patterns, gender roles, or human capital allocations within the marriage.
Apart from short and long term effects, the decision to eventually intermarry may reflect greater commitment to the hosting country in general. Immigrants who find a native partner may be more attached to the hosting country than those who never intermarry. They may have invested in human capital specific to the local labor market and developed precious skills that are highly valued possibly independent of the current marital status. As a consequence, those who eventually intermarry may obtain greater returns to their labor market experience than others.
To account for that,N at i is included as a time-invariant indicator for immigrants who eventually marry a native spouse. The variable is set to one in the years prior, during and after an intermarriage, assuming that abilities can be gained beforehand and need not become redundant with the end of marriage. Because relationships change with time,Nat refers to those who may have several but always native partners. Thus, if β 2 > 0 greater returns to experience are permitted for immigrants who eventually live with native spouses. Immigrants who exclusively marry within the immigrant community are denoted byMig i . 8 Consequently, persons who remain single the whole time are the base category. 9 Parameters ζ 1 , ζ 2 and ζ 3 refer to returns to experience, X it , its square term,
it , and to returns to other observable characteristics captured in Z it . Experience in this context refers to experience in full-time employment acquired in the host country. Z it includes education indicators, self-reported language proficiency, firm size, actual hours worked, tenure and its square term, full-time work, as well as region and industry dummies. Even though years since migration seem to be an important determinant of the probability to intermarry, as argued among others by Chiswick and Housworth (2008) , it is not included in Z it as it evolves similar to experience. Hence, it is not possible to separate the effects of experience and years elapsed in the country. 10 Furthermore, marriage could result from an increase in earnings in previous periods. To account for this correlation and possible reverse causality, dummy variables denoting marriage with a native or with an immigrant in the next period are included.
Finally, intermarried immigrants may possess different unobservable productivity characteristics which correlate with the decision to intermarry. The composite error term therefore consists of a time-invariant individual heterogeneity term, µ i , and an idiosyncratic part, u it .
Definitions
Before turning to the data description, some remarks are necessary to understand possible difficulties related to the definition of immigrants in Germany.
German law defines Germans as persons holding German citizenship. In Ger- 12 The term guest worker refers to foreigners who came to Germany in the course of the guest worker recruitment beginning in the 1950s. Until the mid70s Germany signed treaties with several Souther European countries (Italy, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Portugal and Yugoslavia) to recruit predominately low skilled laborers to work in low qualified sectors. For more detailed and comprehensive information on Germany's immigration history see, for instant, Kalter and Granto (2007) 13 In cases where there is no information available about country of birth for the immigrant and his/her parents, nationality is taken as a single criteria to determine immigrant status.
14 In case both parents are not born in Germany but also not born in the same country, the country of origin of the mother is assumed to outweigh the country of origin of the father. According to this 'classical' role allocation within the family, the mother raises the children while the father works to earn the money. Consequently, the influence, including cultural aspects, of the mother Consequently, Natives are persons born in Germany, holding German citizenship, and whose parents are both German-born with German citizenship. Intermarriage is defined as marriage and marriage-like partnership between an immigrant and a native person. All other relationship types, where both individuals on the child is assumed to be greater than the influence of the father. Therefore, it is assumed that cultural knowledge is transferred from the mother to the child rather than from the father. This argumentation is in line with cross-cultural psychology literature as represented by Phinney et al. (2001) and Warikoo (2005) . However, the number of cases is negligible in the data underlying this study. 15 is put on level of partnership and cohabitation respectively. However, the majority of those who report a partner living in the same household also report to be legally married.
Data
The empirical analysis uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The analysis focuses on potential earning effects for the working population, hence persons aged 20 to 65 who are currently not unemployed and not enrolled in school. Arguments related to the productivity hypothesis are more convincing for immigrants who are not born in Germany. Thus, the focus lies on first generation 16 SOEP sample weights for foreigners relies upon a different definition of immigrant status. Thus, SOEP weighting factors are not used in this analysis.
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immigrants. 17 The underlying unbalanced sample consists of 3,522 first generation men and 3,341 first generation women. 18 The Greece, Italy, and Spain -men with Turkish roots are especially unlikely to inter- 17 Results for all immigrants and those who immigrated after the age of ten are available upon request. One could argue that with increasing age, one loses the ability to quickly learn a new language. Hence, immigrants who come to Germany at an older age face greater difficulties learning German than immigrants arriving at a younger age. Therefore, immigrant children who come at very young ages, might not be remarkably different in their language acquisition from children who are born in Germany to immigrant parents. Thus, separately considering first generation immigrants who immigrated after the age of ten, accounts for possible differences in language proficiency between immigrants born in the host country or who came at early ages on the one hand, and those who immigrated later in life on the other hand. Moreover, ten is the earliest age at which children finish primary school and are sorted into secondary education. Thus, using ten as a cut off point makes the sample more homogeneous in terms of primary education and language acquisition. However, the results do not change essentially with this modification and statistical significance changes most probable due to different sample sizes. 18 Sample attrition is assumed to be random and unrelated to marriage. It thus presumably does not bias the results. 19 Immigrants who report a partner whose immigrant status is not defined are dropped from the sample. Furthermore, those who switch between native and immigrant partners are also excluded from the analysis due to ambiguous results. This restriction seems harmless since only few people switch between native and immigrant partners, and the number of cases where partner's ethnic origin is not definable is also negligible. 20 Regarding selected characteristics presented in Tables 3 and 4, intermarrying immigrants -both men and women -have on average more years of schooling, spent more years in Germany and had more full-time labor market experience than other immigrants. Self-reported language skills of those who eventually live with natives are significantly better than of those who marry other immigrants. Thereby, language proficiency is measured on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 referring to "very poor" language skills and 5 to "very good" abilities. 22 Generally, writing skills are poorer compared to oral qualification regardless of marriage type but it is better for intermarrying immigrants. gle immigrant women earn more than women in intra-immigrant marriage, while single immigrant men earn far less than men in intra-immigrant marriage. (1) : Measured on a scale from 1 ("none at all") to 5 ("very good") (2) : Inflation-adjusted monthly labor gross earnings (1) : Measured on a scale from 1 ("none at all") to 5 ("very good") (2) : Inflation-adjusted monthly labor gross earnings
Empirical Results
The study focuses on first generation male immigrants assuming that (a) men generally benefit from marriage in terms of earnings, (b) effects steming from a native partner are more valuable for the non-native partner, and (c) considering only males avoids selection issues related to female employment. Nevertheless, regressions are run also for immigrant women, even though results need to be treated carefully. 23 The dependent variable is the logarithm of inflation-adjusted monthly labor gross earnings. 24 Apart from successively added marital variables, the baseline specification includes experience and its square term only. Further explanatory variables such as dummy variable indicating the highest schooling degree, selfreported language abilities 25 , tenure and its square, firm size, actual hours worked, and dummy variables accounting for full-time employment status, region, and industry are included in the regressions presented in the last columns of the tables.
For first generation male immigrants, the effect of marriage -regardless of partner descent -amounts to a 12 percent change in earnings according to the OLS results given in the first column of Table 5 . Distinguishing the influence of marriage by migration background of the partner leads to a large increase for those with native partners and a severe decrease for intra-immigrant marriage, Column 2. The effects are not only significantly different from zero but also from each other. Thus, while ignoring self-selection, intermarriage seems highly beneficial 23 Due to a lack of persuasive exclusion restrictions, a selection correction such as suggested by Heckman would rely on the non-linearity of the model only. Because of this caveat no such a correction is made. But, since individual characteristics presumably determine selection into labor force participation, the fixed effects model, at least partly, accounts for possible selection biases. Results for the whole male and female immigrant population as well as for those who immigrated after the age of ten are available upon request. However, except for slight differences in significance levels, the main results do not change with the modification of the samples. 24 Earnings are adjusted by multiplication with the consumer price index. They are expressed in year 2000 earnings. This adjustment makes the use of year dummies redundant and thereby decreases the number of explanatory variables. Results do not change in principle if unadjusted earnings in combination with year dummies are used. 25 This information is only available for foreigners but not for German nationals. -0.000 * * * -0.000 * * * -0.000 * * * -0.000 * * * -0.000 * * * -0.000 -0.000 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Add.Expl. (1) No ; not unemployed, not enrolled in school, report positive earnings Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001 (1) : Dummy for highest schooling degree, hours worked, tenure, full-time dummy, firm size, region and industry dummies, imputation flag. ; not unemployed, not enrolled in school, report positive earnings Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001 (1) : Dummy for highest schooling degree, hours worked, tenure, full-time dummy, firm size, region and industry dummies, imputation flag, dummy for children living in the household.
over marriage with another immigrant.
However, once personal heterogeneity is accounted for results change noticeably, Column 3. 26 The effect of intermarriage is reduced drastically in magnitude and loses significance compared to single immigrants. This implies that the effect of intermarriage is overestimated in the OLS model and the coefficient is upward biased if unobserved factors are ignored. 27 Even though there seems to be no statistically significant effect from intermarriage compared to singles, the difference between effects from intermarriage and intra-immigrant marriage is also not statistically significant. This finding remains unchanged when further marital variables are added to account for development during marriage and general advantages of either marriage type. Thus, intermarriage does not appear to be beneficial to intra-immigrant marriage once selection is taken into account.
Although there seems to be no immediate advantage from one type of marriage over the other, there are significant differences in the returns to experience for those who eventually intermarry and those who eventually marry an immigrant partner. Those who will live with a native some time during their observation, receive greater returns to experience than those who only live with immigrant partners. This difference becomes significant when the model accounts for non-linearity in the returns to experience, Column 6. Adding further explanatory 26 According to the Hausman-Taylor Test the Null-hypothesis of zero correlation between the explanatory variables and the unobserved heterogeneity is rejected. Thus, a random effects model would lead to inconsistent estimates whereas the fixed effects model is consistent -even though it might not be fully efficient. 27 Insignificance of intermarriage compared to singles could also stem from little variance in the indicator variable. Identification comes from those who switch between being single and intermarriage. This identification is relatively limited since only 53 immigrant men switch between being single and reporting native partners.
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variables does not affect these main results, Column 7.
As opposed to men, no marriage premium is found for women, Table 6 . Contrarily, women seem to receive a 'penalty' from marriage in comparison to singles.
However, there is no significant difference between the effect of intermarriage and intra-immigrant marriage in any specification. The magnitude of the marriage coefficients is halved when individual fixed effects are taken into account, indicating that negative influences are overestimated in the OLS model. The coefficients decrease even further and finally lose significance when additional explanatory variables are included. These variables control for observable personal and job related characteristics and seem to explain most of the negative effects.
Native men generally benefit from marriage even after controlling for unobservable factors. However, there are no significant differences between intermarriage and marriage with natives, neither in OLS nor in FE specification. In contrast to immigrant men, experience gained during marriage with natives contributes positively for native men, although there seems to be no significant effect from experience gained during intermarriage. No differences in returns to experience are found between those who ever intermarry and those who do not. This is consistent with the assumption that differences in returns to experience signal greater commitment which is only convincing for immigrants.
Similar to immigrant women, native women do not seem to benefit from marriage. However, for native women intermarriage seems to be less harmful than marriage to other natives -both with and without controlling for individual fixed effects. In particular, apparent disadvantages from intermarriage disappear once unobserved factors are taken into account and especially when controlling for additional observable characteristics. Therefore immigrants who live with natives might work less, take on lower paying jobs or work in occupations that do not match their qualification perfectly to promote partner's labor market success. In this case, the immigrant partner appears to be experiencing a 'penalty' from living with a native while the native partner receives a 'bonus' from intermarriage. 28 In contrast, immigrants in intra-immigrant relationships as well as native men might follow more 'traditional' gender roles where the husband works and the wife takes care of the household. The husband may than benefit from this household specialization. In addition, as pointed out by Baker and Benjamin (1997), intra-immigrant couples may have specific role allocations which favor men's abilities exceptionally. Accordingly, immigrant wives tend to accept any offered occupation upon arrival in order to support their husbands' human capital accumulation. Later, wives retire from the labor market and specialize in household production. 29 This gives rise to the presumption that gender roles in intermarriage may differ from other marital constellations. However, by now this assumption is pure speculation and needs thoroughly verification. 28 This argument is related to those given to explain working spouse penalties, discussed, for instance, by Jacobsen and Rayack (1996); Hotchkiss and Moore (1999); and Song (2007) . 29 Furthermore, intermarried immigrants might not have immigrated for economic reasons. That is, those who immigrated on grounds of marriage with nationals might be less prepared and face more difficulties finding a well paying job than immigrants who based their decision to immigrate on expected economic success. ; not unemployed, not enrolled in school, report positive earnings Robust Standard Errors in parentheses; * p < 0.05, * * p < 0.01, * * * p < 0.001 (1) : Dummy for highest schooling degree, hours worked, tenure, full-time dummy, firm size, region and industry dummies, imputation flag, dummy for children living in the household.
Conclusion
Apart from educational and economic similarity, intermarriage is generally considered a measure of social integration. Additionally, intermarriage is suspected of affecting the economic performance of immigrants as native spouses may foster linguistic adjustment, provide access to certain networks, and help adaptation to the host country's society. However, enhanced productivity of intermarried immigrants might not stem from the native partner directly, but might be attributed to other productivity characteristics that simultaneously drive economic success and partner choice. Thus, accounting for endogeneity is crucial in the context of intermarriage and economic integration. To do so, a fixed effects framework is chosen to measure the effect of intermarriage on earnings. The advantageous structure of the data allows accounting for unobserved heterogeneity and to incorporate different times at which intermarriage might influence individual earnings.
The econometric model considers short and long term effects of intermarriage in contrast to singles and those in an intra-immigrant marriage, and tests the assumption that marital choice signals different human capital accumulation. Accordingly, immigrants who marry natives may obtain greater returns to labor market experience because they better adapt to foreign customs and norms. In that case, the decision to intermarry signals greater commitment and generally better labor market integration of intermarrying immigrants.
Empirical findings for immigrant men indicate that immediate effects from intermarriage are present and exceed that of intra-immigrant marriage in the simple OLS model. However, the corresponding coefficients decrease and lose significance once unobserved abilities are accounted for. There seems to be no sig- 
